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CASE COMMENT
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CORRELATION BETWEEN
STANDARDS OF EVIDENCE TO THE NATURE AND
MAGNITUDE OF INDIVIDUALS' RIGHTS AT STAKE
Gonzalez v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005)
FairC. Kim*
Respondents, Angel Raich and Diane Monson, seriously ill' California
residents who self-administered marijuana products on the advice of their
physicians, and in accordance with the state's Compassionate Use Act of
1996 (CUA), 2 challenged the Federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA)3
as applied to their situation. After federal agents seized marijuana plants
belonging to Monson, both Raich and Monson filed suit in the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California seeking injunctive
and declaratory relief.4 Together they asserted that the federal
government's enforcement of the CSA, as applied to individuals whose
marijuana activities are sanctioned under California's CUA, was an
unconstitutional violation of the Constitution's Commerce Clause.5 The
district court denied Respondents' petition, holding that they did not
demonstrate a likelihood of success based on the merits of their claim, and
thus did not meet the established criteria for injunctive and declaratory
relief.6 Respondents appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which
overturned the district court's ruling and ordered the lower court to grant
* The Author would like to dedicate this Article to his wife, Janet Marie Kim.
1. Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222, 1225 (9th Cir. 2003). Respondent Raich suffered from
ailments including an inoperable brain tumor and a seizure disorder, while Respondent Monson
suffered from a degenerative spinal disease accompanied by severe back pain and spasms. Id.
2. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West 1996). In essence, the code protects
doctors and patients from criminal prosecution when the use of marijuana is prescribed to alleviate
symptoms of illness. Id. § 11.362.5(b)l(B).
3. 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-889 (2005).
4. Raich v. Ashcroft, 248 F. Supp. 2d 918, 921 (N.D. Cal. 2003).
5. Id. at 922. Respondents also challenged the CSA as unconstitutional on the grounds that
it violated their substantive rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and that
it violated the Ninth and Tenth Amendment. Gonzalez v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2200 (2005). The
instant Court explicitly declined to address Respondents' non-Commerce Clause arguments because
the lower court did not address such issues. Id. at 2215.
6. Raich, 248 F. Supp. 2d at 931.
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injunctive relief to Respondents. 7 The court of appeals found that
Respondents demonstrated the requisite likelihood of success based on
their assertion that the CSA violated the Commerce Clause as applied to
them, thus warranting injunctive relief.' The U.S. Supreme Court granted
certiorari, vacated the decision, and remanded the case. The Court HELD,
that enforcement of the CSA, as applied to Respondents, was not an
unconstitutional violation of the Commerce Clause.9
In assessing the validity of federal legislation, the U.S. Supreme Court
has evaluated the merits of each claim by considering empirical evidence
found within the record itself, congressional findings, and other evidence
the Court deems persuasive.'0 In Wickardv. Filburn,the Court evaluated
statistical evidence within the record to determine the validity of the
government's assertion that local activity may have a substantial effect on
interstate commerce, and thus fell under congressional authority." In
Wickard, the Appellee produced wheat in excess of a federal quota2
promulgated within the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 (AAA).'
After being fined,' 3 Appellee challenged the AAA as unconstitutionally
outside the scope of the Commerce Clause because the surplus wheat was
intended solely for self-consumption, thus having an insignificant impact
upon interstate commerce.' 4 Based on analysis of statistical data stipulated
by both parties in the record,' 5 the Court found that while Appellee's noncommercial production of wheat may not have impacted the interstate
wheat market on an individual basis, the aggregate effect of all such
activity likely had a substantial effect on the larger market. Therefore, such
activity was susceptible to federal regulation under the Commerce
Clause.6

7. Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222, 1235 (9th Cir. 2003).
8. Id.
9. Gonzalez, 125 S. Ct. at 2215.
10. See Wickard v. Filburn 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942) (utilizing empirical data available
within the record, as stipulated by both parties); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622,
666 (1994) (deeming congressional findings appropriate as a factual source in a case implicating
fundamental rights only if credible after judicial review); Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497
U.S. 261, 287 (1990) (affirming a state government's use of "clear and convincing" standard in a
case implicating the right to medical treatment).
11. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125.
12. Id. at 113.
13. Filburn reaped an additional 239 bushels for a total fine of $117.11. Id. at 114-15.
14. Id. at 119.
15. Id. at 125.
16. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 127-28.
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The Court has also taken into account congressional findings when
assessing a constitutional challenge to federal legislation. 7 When dealing
with certain fundamental rights, however, the Court has rejected the notion
of accepting congressional findings at face value. Instead, the Court has
subjected such findings to heightened judicial review. 8 In Turner
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. F.C.C., the Court did not blindly accept
congressional findings in evaluating whether a federal communications
regulation exceeded constitutional boundaries. 9 In Turner, Congress
passed the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of
1992 (Cable Act), mandating cable companies reserve channels for local
and public access stations. 20 Appellants, various cable television entities,
sought relief claiming that such a regulation abridged their First
Amendment rights. 2' The Court concluded that congressional findings,
while accorded deference, are still subject to the Court's determination that
Congress "has drawn reasonable inferences based on substantial evidence"
when legislating in an area that implicates a fundamental right.22
In evaluating whether government regulation in the area of medical
self-determination was constitutional, the U.S. Supreme Court has
recognized a "constitutionally protected liberty interest" in competent
individuals to choose whether or not to undergo medical treatment.23 In
Cruzanv. Director,MissouriDepartmentofHealth,Appellants, as parents
of an incompetent patient in a persistive vegetative state, sought to allow
the removal of a life-sustaining feeding tube from their daughter. 24 The
state required clear and convincing evidence that an incompetent patient
would refuse treatment before an accommodation to remove the feeding

17. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 666 (1994).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 632. The Cable Act was enacted in large part because Congress, after three years
of hearings, deemed cable television a growing threat to the viability of local television stations in
their ability to compete with cable companies. Id. at 632-33.
21. Id. at 634. Specifically, the appellants contended that enforcement ofthe Cable Act would
violate their First Amendment rights by compelling a content-based standard manifest within the
Cable Act. Id. at 653. If indeed the Cable Act was deemed to be content-based, such a distinction
would trigger a strict-scrutiny (versus intermediate scrutiny) judicial standard in evaluating the
constitutionality of the law. Id. at 642.
22. Turner, 512 U.S. at 666. The Court claimed that while the implication of First
Amendment rights did not give broad license to review congressional findings as evidence de novo,
the Court should satisfy itself that Congress's conclusions were based on "substantial evidence."
Id.
23. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990).
24. Id. at 265.
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tube would be granted.25 The Court held that such criterion was
constitutionally valid.26 Reasoning that because an incompetent patient
could not assert her fundamental right to choose whether to undergo
treatment or not, the Court found the state's standard of proof criteria
appropriate considering the nature of the right. 7 Thus, the Court in Cruzan
reiterated an individual's right to make decisions regarding medical
treatment.2 8 More significantly, the Court endorsed a higher standard of
evidentiary proof in cases involving such a right.29
The Court has demonstrated a flexible standard in terms of the quality
and nature of evidence necessary to allow consideration of a constitutional
challenge to a government regulation. a Depending on the basis for
constitutional challenge, as well as the type of right allegedly infringed
upon, the Court has varied its approach to evidence accordingly.3
In the instant case, the Court deferentially accepted Congress' nonparticularized findings32 at face value when evaluating whether the CSA
was constitutionally valid under the Commerce Clause.33 Despite the
potential impact that the legislation in question may have had on
Respondents' right to medical treatment, the instant Court determined that,
based on congressional findings, the cultivation of marijuana for medical
use had the requisite "substantial effect" on interstate commerce to come
under the Commerce Clause.34 The instant Court acknowledged that the
congressional findings that established the nexus between local marijuana
production and the national marijuana market did not directly address
Respondents' limited cultivation and use of the drug.35 However, the
instant Court denied the necessity of particularized findings for Congress

25. Id. at 280.

26. Id. at 287.
27. Id. at 283. The Court indicated that in cases involving the termination of medical
treatment, great emphasis should be placed on the issue of irreversibility of potential error in
determining the standard of proof. Id.
28. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 281.
29. Id. at 287.
30. See supra text accompanying note 10.
31. See supra text accompanying note 10.
32. Gonzalez v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2208 (2005). The findings include general
conclusions noting that "[lI]ocal distribution and possession of controlled substances contribute to
swelling the interstate traffic in such substances." Id. at 2203 n.20 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 801(4)).
33. Id. at 2208.
34. Id. at 2207. Although the Court explicitly concludes that local production of marijuana
has a substantial effect on the supply and demand aspects of the drug's interstate market, the Court
later denies the necessity for explicitly concluding so when ascertaining the validity of the CSA
under the Commerce Clause. Id. at 2208.
35. Id.
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to legislate within the context of the Commerce Clause."
inl
iistant Cort
concluded that the general findings of Congress, as applied to the illicit
intrastate cultivation and use of marijuana, were likewise applicable to
Respondents' limited use under the CUA 7 Additionally, the instant Court
found that the generalized findings had established ample cause to warrant
Congress's rational claim that the CSA was applicable to Respondents'
activities because they likely had a substantial effect on the interstate
market.3"
By foregoing critical analysis of the evidence intrinsic to the
congressional findings39 that established the link between intrastate
marijuana cultivation and its effect on the interstate market, the Court
failed to articulate precisely how Congress could rationally conclude that
home-consumed medical marijuana substantially impacted the interstate
commerce of the drug.4" The instant Court advanced its Commerce Clause
argument practically in lock-step with the Wickard Court's line of
argument.41 However, the instant Court created an exception to the
standard of evidence used to substantiate the link between a local homegrown product to its respective interstate market.42 In doing so, the instant
Court left its reasoning paradigm vulnerable to assertions that its tolerance
of the quality of evidence used in the instant case 43 was inconsistent with
the standards of earlier cases such as Turner and Cruzan.4 Respondents'
36. Id.The Court notes that while congressional findings are especially helpful when taken
into consideration for Commerce Clause cases in which the nexus between activity and commerce
are not readily apparent, a lack of particularized findings does not preclude legislative
constitutionality. Id.
37. Gonzalez, 125 S.Ct. at 2208.
38. Id. at 2208-09.
39. The instant Court's lack of critical scrutiny of the generalized findings was presumably
not for a lack of empirical data regarding the statistical impact of individual users under the CUA:
in preemptively rebutting the dissent's argument, the majority cited discrete numerical data from
three sources. Id. at 2213-15. Likewise, the dissent cites discrete numerical data regarding the nexus
between local distribution and use of marijuana for medicinal purposes. Id. at 2228 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
40. Id.at 2207.
41. Id.at 2206. The instant Court describes the similarities between the two cases as
"striking" while noting distinction only in that the AAA was enacted to stabilize prices of a lawful
wheat market in Wickard while the CSA was enacted to eliminate the illegal marijuana market in
the instant case. Id. n.29.
42. Gonzalez, 125 S. Ct. at 2207-08.
43. The evidence standard of the instant case was not explicitly delineated, but the absence
of a rigorous scrutiny ofthe congressional findings is self-evidently distinct from the instant Court's
comparison to its earlier evidentiary standard in Wickard.Id.
44. The evidentiary standard asserted in Turner may be summarized as the non-acceptance
of congressional findings without judicial scrutiny when First Amendment rights are implicated.
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asserted rights in the instant case rise to a similar level of fundamental
importance as those of the appellants in Turner and Cruzan.45 Thus,
considering the significant nature of Respondents' rights,' the instant
Court's lack of verification of the congressional findings undermines its
conclusion that intrastate marijuana activity under the CUA would have
a substantial effect on the interstate market.47
The Court repeatedly emphasized the similarities between the instant
case and Wickard.48 The Court first laid the foundation for evaluating the
CSA under the Commerce Clause, with regards to the class of activities
involved. The Court next drew heavily on the doctrine established in
Wickard that local activities having a "substantial effect" on interstate
commerce were subject to legislation.49 In Wickard, however, the Court
enjoyed the benefit of stipulated empirical evidence that established the
causal link between the aggregate effect of individuals such as the appellee
and the resulting broad impact on the interstate wheat market. 50

Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 666 (1994). The evidentiary standard endorsed
by the Court in Cruzan, was "clear and convincing" evidence. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo..Dep't of Health,
497 U.S. 261, 285 (1990).
45. The right asserted in Turnerwas the First Amendment right to freedom of speech. Turner,
512 U.S. at 666. The right asserted in Cruzan was the right to medical self-determination (balanced
against the right of the state to preserve an individual's right). Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278.
46. Similar to the rights asserted in Cruzan, Respondents' rights in the instant case stem from
the notion of medical self-determination: the right to use a substance proven to be effective in the
treatment of their respective maladies. Gonzalez, 125 S. Ct. at 2200.
47. Had the instant Court used the discrete evidentiary findings that the majority cited in
rebutting the dissent's contentions to bolster its reasoning instead of relying solely on the
generalized congressional findings within the text of the CSA, its comparison to Wickard would
have been decidedly more compelling. See generally Turner, 512 U.S. at 666 (evincing a
preference for greater scrutiny of congressional findings to ensure that conclusions are based on
"substantial evidence").
48. The instant Court was not alone in its comparison of the farmer in Wickard and
Respondents Raich and Monson; the dissenting opinion in the underlying Appellate decision
claimed that, "[e]xcept for why the marijuana at issue in this case is consumed, i.e., for medicinal
rather than nutritional purposes, [Raich and Monson's] conduct is entirely indistinguishable from
that of Mr. Filbum's." Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222, 1238 (9th Cir. 2003) (Beam, J.,
dissenting).
49. The instant Court reiterated that there are three broad areas where Congress is authorized
to legislate under the auspices of the Commerce Clause: the channels of interstate commerce, the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce (including persons or things in interstate commerce), and
activities which have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. Gonzalez, 125 S. Ct. at 2205.
Noting that only the last category was relevant to the instant case, the Court explicitly stated that
Congress is within its power to "regulate purely local activities that are part of an economic 'class
of activities' that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce." Id.
50. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942).
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The statistical data within the Wickard record enabled the Court to
accurately assess whether Congress had a rational basis for enacting the
law that encompassed the appellee's activities because such data bore a
direct and undisputed nexus to the exact activity in which the appellee was
engaged." In the instant case, there existed no empirical data within the
record from which to evaluate the rationality behind Congress's intent in
enacting the CSA.52 Although the CSA legislation contained congressional
findings regarding the general nature of illicit intrastate production and its
corresponding effect on the broader marijuana market, the findings did not
address the limited intrastate production of the drug for use in accordance
with a state law such as the CUA.53
Thus, the findings that Congress relied upon in enacting the CSA did
not directly address the impact that individuals like the Respondents have
on the larger interstate market. 4 Through extrapolation of the general
congressional findings, the instant Court concluded with near certainty that
Congress had a rational basis for enacting legislation that regulated
Respondents' particular activities." Such a self-assured finding is
undermined in light of the fact that the instant Court never weighed any
evidence that bore directly and specifically to Respondents' conduct.
Although the instant Court conceded that the congressional findings
within the CSA did not speak directly to Respondents' activities, it
disclaimed the need for such particularized findings in assessing whether
Congress met the rational basis standard when enacting the CSA.5 6
However, the instant Court noted that particularized findings were required

51. Id. The statistical data that both parties stipulated as part of the record in Wickard
included surplus wheat data as it pertained to each state, yearly percentages of decline in wheat
exports over time, and the impact, in terms of percentage, that home-consumption of surplus wheat
has on the overall amount of wheat. Id. at 125-27.
52. Gonzalez, 125 S. Ct. at 2208. The instant Court relied on the general assertions regarding
the impact of locally grown and distributed marijuana has on the illicit, interstate market for the
drug. See supra text accompanying note 30.
53. Gonzalez, 125 S. Ct. at 2208.
54. Although the generalized congressional findings offer no statistical data on the effect that
individuals in Respondents' situation would have on the interstate marijuana market, the dissent
cites compelling data that indicates that the impact would be minimal. Id. at 2228 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting). This is not to say that the majority opinion does not note the potential impact that
medical-use marijuana may have on the interstate market place in statistical terms; indeed, the
instant Court claims that the quantity limits available to patients under the CUA are commensurate
with a substantial effect when the aggregate limits of all potential users are considered. Id. at 221415. However, such potential speculation only serves to possibly predict a "worst case scenario"
rather than drawing conclusions from statistical evidence.
55. Id. at 2208.
56. Id.
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in cases where a "special concern" such as the protection of free speech
was at stake. 7 Although the appellants in Turner did not challenge the
Cable Act as unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause,58 the Turner
Court's skepticism of congressional findings as facially valid was based
on the rights at stake rather than the mode of constitutional attack. 9 The
Turner Court seriously questioned whether generalized congressional
findings were adequate, in and of themselves, when the nature of the rights
at stake was inherently significant.6' The elevated sense of wariness that
the Turner Court exhibited towards accepting congressional findings at
face value is absent in the instant Court's scrutiny of the congressional
findings within the CSA.61 However, such deferential acceptance of
congressional findings by the instant Court is consistent with the Turner
Court's evidentiary standard only if the rights asserted in the instant case
are significantly less fundamental than the rights implicated in Turner.62
Indeed, the instant Court does not explicitly address the rights asserted
by Respondents as impacting the level of deference accorded to
congressional findings.63 However, if Cruzan is indicative of the level of
significance the Court accords to an individual's rights in matters of
medical treatment, then the instant Court's ambivalence towards
Respondents' asserted rights was inconsistent with its earlier posture in
Cruzan. 4
57. Id.
58. The Turnerappellants challenged the Cable Act on the grounds that it violated the First
Amendment. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 666 (1994).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Gonzalez, 125 S. Ct. at 2208.
62. The instant Court, in deeming that particularized congressional findings were not
necessary in determining that local marijuana activity had a substantial effect on the market stated
that particularized findings were appropriate only if "special concern[s]" were at stake. Id.
However, by logical extension of such a policy, one can only conclude that the instant Court found
the issues and rights at stake in the instant case not to be special concerns.
63. Throughout the bulk of the majority opinion, the instant Court makes no mention of
Respondents' right (whether valid or not) to medical treatment. See generally id.at 2195 (omitting
reference to Respondents' rights in determining whether the Commerce Clause applies to the CSA).
Just prior to its conclusion, however, the instant Court makes brief mention of the substantive due
process rights of Respondents-but only in declining to address the issue. Id. at 2215.
64. By linking the issue of medical treatment self-determination to a heightened standard of
proof, the Court in Cruzan established that such a right was significant, if not fundamental. See
Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261,278 (1990) (explicitly deeming that a competent
person has a "constitutionally protected liberty interest" in refusing medical treatment). Thus, the
right of Respondents in the instant case (namely, the right to medical access to medicinal-use
marijuana) would appear by logical extension to be a right of similar magnitude and import. See

2006]
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Although in Cruzan the Court did not explicitly make a determination
as to what nature and quality of evidence for cases involving a patient's
right to medical treatment was appropriate, the Court sanctioned the
appellee's use of the "clear and compelling" standard. 65 Thus, the Cruzan
Court's emphasis on the necessity for a higher threshold of evidence
quality suggests that a heightened standard of evidence in the instant case
is not inconsistent with the rationale expressed in Cruzan.
Admittedly, Respondents' rights in the instant case are not identical to
the rights asserted in Cruzan. Nor are the facts or procedural history of
each case substantially related.66 However, the essential nature ofthe rights
asserted in each case is of similar magnitude, and of comparable origin,
when viewed in the context of the quality of evidence deemed appropriate
for consideration by'the Court.67
The Court, in Wickard, Turner, and Cruzan, exhibited a general trend
with regards to the quality and nature of evidence considered when
assessing whether a government entity is unconstitutionally encroaching
on an individual's rights: absent empirical evidence within the record that
speaks specifically to the situation at hand, the quality of evidence
considered should be vetted to an increasingly higher standard as the rights
involved grow in significance. 68 The Turner Court explicitly rejected the
notion of accepting congressional findings at face value when the rights
asserted were of a fundamental nature-such as First Amendment rights.6 9
Likewise, the Cruzan Court endorsed a higher expectation of factual
determination when the right of medical self-determination was at stake.7"
The instant Court, by disclaiming the need for findings that speak precisely
to the activities of the Respondents, strikes an incongruent stance with its
earlier decisions.
generally CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West 1996) (explicitly granting the right for
seriously ill Californians' access to medical-use marijuana).
65. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 292.
66. The procedural history of Cruzan commenced with a suit seeking injunctive and
declaratory relief and was decided at the trial level on the basis of the relief sought-i.e., whether
or not the movant had a strong likelihood of success on the merits when combined with the balance
of harm favoring the movant, and the component of public interest favoring the movant's case.
Raich v. Ashcrofi, 248 F. Supp. 2d 918, 921 (N.D. Cal. 2003).
67. See supra text accompanying note 62.
68. CompareTurner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622 (1994) (necessitating greater
scrutiny of congressional findings when fundamental rights are implicated), and Cruzan, 497 U.S.
at 261 (endorsing the "clear and convincing" standard when significant medical rights are at stake),
with Wickard v. Filburn, 3.17 U.S. 111 (1942) (relying on empirical statistical evidence stipulated
to by both parties as sufficient to determine the merits of a Commerce Clause challenge).
69. Turner,512 U.S. at 666.
70. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 292.
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By merely accepting the generalized findings of Congress and
extrapolating the factual result necessary to justify its determination that
Congress rationally intended to include Respondents' activities within the
scope of the CSA, the instant Court requires a leap of logic that is
inappropriate when the rights at stake are literally a matter of life and
death. The majority's reasoning paradigm in concluding that the intrastate
marijuana market under the CUA has a substantial effect on interstate
commerce was cobbled together upon a ramshackle foundation composed
of evidence coaxed from generalized, un-vetted findings. In the instant
case, given the significant, if not fundamental, nature of the rights at stake,
such a ruling may soon be toppled from its shaky perch by a well-crafted,
and procedurally intact, substantive due-process challenge.7

71. Interestingly, while declining to address Respondents' substantive due process claim, the
instant Court offered two possible alternatives for Respondents' relief: the possibility of challenging
the classification of marijuana within the framework of the CSA, and the prospect of democratically
convincing Congress to modify the CSA. Gonzalez v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2215 (2005).

